The International Cessna 170 Association

I recall on my first day of instruction in a C-150, before even starting the engine, that I was taught to release the controls when told by my instructor "I have the airplane". Our company uses a 3-step pilot monitoring process which includes taking over the controls as the final step. Step 1. Identify the deviation. E.g "10 knots fast". If no response or inappropriate response step 2 is to command the correction -- e.g. "reduce thrust". Finally the third step is intervention which may come down to the Capt. saying, "I have the airplane" as he takes control of the aircraft. Now with 64 year old grandpas and grandmas in the left seat it's generally going to be the F/O quietly saying "I have the airplane" as he turns down the interior lights to the sound of snoring.

But as this is a "flame the Airbus" thread here's some more fuel.

I've done that with RC gliders when in a hurry.
It's a sick feeling to watch your 3 meter going up the winch and you realize you plugged the ailerons in backwards.

But as this is a "flame the Airbus" thread here's some more fuel.[/quote]

I really hope this thread isn't being viewed as a "Flame the Airbus" thread. This is to get people talking about LOC-I. Yes, several very high profile recent accidents have involved Airbus, but the F-B-W aspect of the Airbus is only one of the many issues or links in the accident chain in these events. The event should never have progressed to that point. Teaching UPRT I saw 90% of our customers make inappropriate control inputs to upsets early in their training. Proper training quickly corrected these problems. I can post links to other Non-Airbus incidents if you would like, but we will be getting into those in the next few months with my LOC article series/training.

Thank You for your input and thoughts though. I would rather see your comment, than not.

Jughead

Aryana wrote:To avoid being like the guys that almost crashed in Gary's link above...point your thumb up while you check the controls for freedom and movement and it always points towards the aileron that should deflect up.

If you need a "rule of thumb" to figure out which aileron needs to be up, you really have no business in the left seat.

Aryana wrote:I will take all the help I can get Miles. IMO, much better men (and pilots) than me have met their untimely end for the simplest of things that seem so trivial in aviation.

No dis to you intended, Arash! I think the problem isn't knowing which way they go, it's remembering to check.

When doing a preflight, I still look at the yokes when i push the aileron up.
But that might not be practical on a commercial jet

Jon, I'm looking forward to these articles. Lately, I've been reviewing the NTSB database on C-170 accidents. There are a lot where the same aircraft has numerous entries, some up to three. Many seem like boneheaded accidents--buzzing under the influence for example-- but then there are those where I have to say, "There, but for the grace of God, go I".

counsellj wrote:5. Poor communications leads to more problems, BE DIRECTIVE with CLEAR, CONCISE and CORRECT comm.

I wonder if the crew in the Air Asia accident was communicating in English or Indonesian. In Indonesian "dorong" means push, "tarik" means pull. I can't imagine the Captain using "tarik" to command nose down pitch unless he was using a second language.

Gary,
When I was flying on the Pacific with World Airways, we spent a lot of time in Honolulu on layovers and got pretty well acquainted with some Americans that were training JAL pilots in the B-727 there in Hawaii. They mentoined that, even in training, when the bad stuff piled up, the Japanese pilot trainees just seemed to lose their second language english and completely reverted to japanese.

n2582d wrote:... I wonder if the crew in the Air Asia accident was communicating in English or Indonesian. In Indonesian "dorong" means push, "tarik" means pull. I can't imagine the Captain using "tarik" to command nose down pitch unless he was using a second language.

I'm not sure what language they were using at the time, but I just heard a news clip that said the non-flying pilot told the flying pilot to "pull down", thus the confusion. But, we all KNOW that the media always gets it right when it comes to airplanes...

I just read the PDF report linked on the first page. In it the Indonesian NTSB states that the Captain was Indonesian and the First Officer was French. In the cockpit they were both using English as a second language. Actually it appears the copilot didn't say much at all. His only words that the transcript records were in French, "What is going wrong?" -- An interesting parallel to what Blueldr noted about the Japanese 727 pilots reverting to their native tongue in the heat of the battle. English could even have been a third language for the Captain if he grew up speaking Javanese. So it is not surprising that in the stress of the moment he said, "pull down".

I'm reminded of some coworkers of ours during Indonesian language school in Bandung. The wife was having contractions so she and her husband hopped in a taxi to a hospital in Jakarta. The taxi driver was driving too fast down the curvy mountain road so they said, or thought they said, "too fast!" numerous times in Indonesian. Each time the driver sped up rather than slowed down. What they actually said was "lebih jepat" or "more fast". Finally the taxi driver said, "I can't go any faster!" One can't overstate the difficulty of communicating in a foreign tongue, especially when things are tense.

Seafeye wrote:Not to stir up the pot, but isn't there still a missing 777 out there?

I'm with ghostflyer's opinion on Airbus. We don't know the missing 777 had anything at all to do with Loss of control (LOC). At least with a Boeing you can actually SEE where your crewmember has the yoke.
As for the missing Malaysian 777, I'm more suspicious of the Asian crew mentality and/or mishandling of a cabin pressurization event. At my most recent workplace, Asian (and some middle-Eastern) "pilots" previous vehicular operational experience might be limited to nothing more sophisticated than the manual window-crank on the backseat of a taxicab. Automation-dependency is a problem.
We had them arrive in groups, always in uniform with epaulets. They came to training with the entire curriculum and AFM memorized down to punctuation..... and had ZERO stick-and-rudder skills. They are universally reluctant to challenge senior crewmembers, and therefore miss the CRM triangle completely.
They were quite good at quickly engaging AP for stall recovery. (No, I'm not joking, I'm serious.)

gahorn wrote:

Seafeye wrote:Not to stir up the pot, but isn't there still a missing 777 out there?

I'm with ghostflyer's opinion on Airbus. We don't know the missing 777 had anything at all to do with Loss of control (LOC). At least with a Boeing you can actually SEE where your crewmember has the yoke.
As for the missing Malaysian 777, I'm more suspicious of the Asian crew mentality and/or mishandling of a cabin pressurization event. At my most recent workplace, Asian (and some middle-Eastern) "pilots" previous vehicular operational experience might be limited to nothing more sophisticated than the manual window-crank on the backseat of a taxicab. Automation-dependency is a problem.
We had them arrive in groups, always in uniform with epaulets. They came to training with the entire curriculum and AFM memorized down to punctuation..... and had ZERO stick-and-rudder skills. They are universally reluctant to challenge senior crewmembers, and therefore miss the CRM triangle completely.
They were quite good at quickly engaging AP for stall recovery. (No, I'm not joking, I'm serious.)

George you are absolutely correct. The CRM triangle is the core problem with foreign carriers. Culture plays a huge roll in aviation hierarchy.